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Abstract– Trade credit is an important way of firm financing. Its habitual
practice and the excessive enlargement of the payment periods deteriorate
profitability of firms and even could affect the performance of the financial
system. In spite of the relevance of this issue there are few empirical researches
with Spanish firms. This work intends to fill this gap and to shed light on the
factors related to the extension of trade credit in a set firms of the agrofood
industry. In the theoretic and empirical literature different motives have been
proposed to explain the extension of trade credit: a mechanism to reduce
transaction costs, a financial alternative to the bank system and an additional
tool to improve commercial activities.
To contrast these ideas a panel of 388 firms for the period 1998-2005 has
been taken, and static and dynamic regression models have been estimated by
using robust methods to heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and endogeneity
of the explanatory variables. The results confirm that trade credit receivable
is associated with more active firms and with cheaper bank financing. Fur-
thermore, a negative link with the size of the firm and a positive relationship
with short-term liabilities, accounts payable and bank debts, are encountered.
These findings are consistent with commercial perspectives, rather than a
pure financial view, in the sense that small and financial distressed producers
extend trade credit as a way of promoting products and increasing sales.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Trade credit arises in commercial operations when goods or services are not paid immedi-
ately on delivery but the payment is deferred for a certain period of time. This behavior
alters the working capital needed to finance the production process and in turn has effects
on the individual decision making of firms. Its generalized use can affect the relationships
between firms and may also diminish the profitability of creditor companies. What is
more, trade credit operates out of the bank system and thus works without transparency
on conditions and habitual practices and without control of the monetary authority. This
entails a risk since it can modify monetary aggregates and the mechanism of transmission
of monetary policy.
A first approach of its importance in the Spanish economy can be obtained from the
Central Balance Sheet Data of Banco de Espan˜a (Banco de Espan˜a, 2006). It shows
this source of finance reaches, on average, 14.5 percent of total assets, 34.6 percent of
total debts and 42.8 percent short-term debts. Moreover, trade credit is a structural
phenomenon that persists through time. And this causes somewhat puzzlement as does
not seem logic, within developed economies with powerful financial systems, that suppliers
were the most important short-term financing channel. Despite such a relevant role, there
is a lack of knowledge on the causes that move nonfinancial firms to extend credit.
In the last years Administration has been aware of the problem that trade credit may
cause and it is trying to stop the excessive enlargement of payment periods and to avoid
the deterioration of small and middle firms’ profitability. It was made concrete in the
Directive 2000/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council which establishes
measures to fight late payments in commercial transactions. However, there are hardly
studies on trade credit and its motivations in the productive agrofood sector. The aim of
this work is to study the recent evolution of trade credit granted in a sample of agrofood
companies and to identify the characteristics associated with the firms that extend more
credit. It is an attempt to shed light on the motives that induce agrofood suppliers to
offer delayed payments.
Different reasons have been argued to explain the use of trade credit: a mechanism to
save transaction cost, an alternative financial channel to the bank system and a tool to
promote sales and widen markets. The latter would seem a more appropriate explanation
for financially constrained firms selling on credit and allowing delayed payment, as it is
observed in Spanish food industry. But contrary to this, other empirical studies using
Spanish firms support financial theories of trade credit (Herna´ndez de Cos and Hernando,
1999, Rodr´ıguez-Rodr´ıguez, 2006). Thus, we think there is an interest in validating or
refuting these competing explanations in the agrofood industry.
To achieve this, information from mercantile official registers was taken so a panel data
was constructed for 388 firms and 8 consecutive years (1998-2005). Different regression
models have been estimated through generalized method of moments (GMM) that is
more appropriate in situations with heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and endogeneity
of the regressors. The results indicate that the level of activity of the firm, debt cost,
size and short-term liabilities are the factors more related with the extension of trade
credit. The remaining of this work is structured as follows: theories and empirics on
trade credit are summarized in section , whereas section presents the specification and
3estimation procedures of the regression models used in this work; then the data of the
Spanish agrofood industry are commented (section ), jointly with the results. Finally,
section concludes.
II. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND
The motivations for the use of trade credit must be sought in market failures. Without
them, there is no reasonable argument that justifies the fact that firms are so used to selling
on credit. As mentioned by Blazenko and Vandezande (2003), if product and financial
markets are competitive and transaction or information costs do not exist, no advantage is
obtained by offering or receiving trade credit. There have been numerous arguments and
theories that explain the use of trade credit as a consequence of frictions in the payments
system and of imperfections in the financial and product markets.
A. Operational motives
It seems evident that the practice of trade credit lessens transaction costs. Delayed
payments permit to accumulate invoices, which in turn diminishes the number of
payments and makes easier and cheaper the cash management (Schwartz, 1974).
Furthermore, long-term cooperation agreements between sellers and buyers can op-
timize the flows of goods and cash (Ferris, 1981). Even other costs derived of an
irregular demand (such as customer queues o large inventories) can be reduced by
improving (constraining) the trade credit conditions in situations of deficit (excess)
in demand (Emery, 1984). Both buyer’s and seller’s wealth may increase because
both save costs, the former from lower prices and the latter by reducing inventory
or production. It means that trade credit, although is a short-term element, can
hold a strategic role in the firm decision making (Emery, 1987).
In the empirical side, these arguments could imply that firms with irregular demand
grant more credit to customers than firms with more stable demand, so the coeffi-
cient of variation of sales is a potential measure to test this idea. In account of the
fact that a seller and a buyer may establish a long-term cooperation relationship,
the former will extend more credit in response to a tighter financial environment
(Ferris, 1981). Thus a positive relationship between trade credit and the interest
rate may be expected. Other authors consider that transaction costs it does not
say too much about the different use between firms and industries in spite of this
motive probably induces an important amount of trade credit (Schwartz, 1974).
B. Financial motives
Despite the main activity of suppliers is not financial, they may exhibit better capac-
ities than financial institutions derived from advantages in information acquisition,
in controlling buyers and in recovering the goods supplied, as explained by Petersen
and Rajan (1997). First, sellers have more information than financial institutions to
know the creditworthiness of the buyers as they operate within a common industry.
This implies that sellers can recognize more easily potential problems of risk default
and reduce losses from customers (Smith, 1987). She also comments that different
implicit interest rates and trade credit conditions may exist across industries since
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possibility of stopping new supplies of goods, and this can be used to enforce buyers
to meet their payment obligations (Petersen and Rajan, 1997, Cun˜at, 2007). Third,
suppliers could take the goods and resell them in case the buyer fails the payment of
the purchase (Emery, 1984, Mian and Smith, 1992). Since financial institutions do
not have to do with production activities, sellers can do these operations in better
conditions.
Another financial argument shows how taxes motivate trade credit. According to
Brick and Fung (1984), the direction of the trade credit flow depends on the dif-
ferent marginal tax rates between buyers and sellers. For example, a customer
will prefer to buy on credit (for cash) if its tax rate is lower (higher) than that of
the seller. As a consequence, sellers with high tax rates are more likely to extend
credit. Furthermore, the motives for giving and receiving trade credit are mutually
excluding.
Financial motives have been tested in empirical works by using different measures
that approximate the availability to obtain funds. The cost of external financing of
the firm is the most direct alternative of quantifying its access to financial markets.
That is, lower debt costs imply better conditions and might lead to provide more
credit to clients. This negative relationship is supported by several empirical studies,
Herna´ndez de Cos and Hernando (1999, on Spanish firms),Rodr´ıguez-Rodr´ıguez
(2006, on Canary Island firms) and Marotta (2005, on Italian firms), among others.
Size and age can be seen as expressions of quality and reputation of the company,
which could also mean a better access to capital markets. Therefore they can be
thought as appropriate proxies for credit worthiness of a firm. A positive relationship
between size and accounts receivable is found by Petersen and Rajan (1997, on U.S.
firms), Herna´ndez de Cos and Hernando (1999) and Delannay and Weill (2004, on
firms from several Eastern European Countries), meanwhile a positive effect of the
age of the firm on trade credit given is observed in the works by Petersen and Rajan
(1997), Rodr´ıguez-Rodr´ıguez (2006).
Other explanatory variables used to test financial motives are the ratio of equity
to total assets (Delannay and Weill, 2004) or the return on assets ratio (Marotta,
2005), as measures of internal funds availability with influence on trade operations.
Rodr´ıguez-Rodr´ıguez (2006) uses the operating result on turnover ratio to test fi-
nancial motives arguing that the more profitable a firm the more likely it is to access
institutional finance.
Although financing motivation causes a large amount of credit in commercial oper-
ations, it does not give a satisfactory explanation of why small sellers offer, or why
large buyers take, trade credit (Smith, 1987).
C. Commercial motives
Much has been written on the role of trade credit as a way of stimulating the
purchases of sellers. Nadiri (1969) was the first who considered trade credit as a
selling expense. Like advertising, it affects the position of the firm and provides
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the context of the neoclassical theory of the firm. Sellers can make an improved offer
(product plus credit), and in the long-run, they will try to establish a dependent and
lasting relationship with buyers in search of maximizing expected profits (Wilner,
2000).
Price discrimination toward financially constrained buyers is another view linked to
commercial motives (Brennan et al., 1988, Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Potential
buyers with difficulties to obtain credit of the banking system constitute new op-
portunities. Giving easier terms of payment to this segment through trade credit,
seller’s market can be extended.
Other authors (Smith, 1987, Long et al., 1993) argue that when a supplier offers
delayed payments he adds the possibility of verifying the quality of its products.
Trade credit has a promotional or commercial motivation in the sense that the
buyer pays once the quality of goods is known. By selling on credit, small, new or
not well-established companies can enhance competitiveness in relation to similar
suppliers. Another suggestion of this idea is that postponed payments are expected
when a reputable buyer does not know too much on the performance of the seller,
so the delayed period is used to check it.
And associated with this, the frequent observation that large companies pay late or
take unearned discounts could be interpreted as a quasi-rent on the buyer’s reputa-
tional capital (Smith, 1987) but also as a demonstration of market power. Wilner
(2000) also enquires why firms without financial problems take trade credit. He
analyzes the effect of bilateral relationships and posits that they can be damaging
if one firm depends on the other. More explicitly Van Horen (2004) suggests that
a supplier dealing with large clients is more likely to permit delayed payments in
order to avoid its change to another supplier. Rather than a voluntary offer, she
contemplates the possibility that was the customer who forces the supplier to sell
on credit under the threat of not buying and looking for another suppliers. She
formulates the ”reputation” hypothesis as ” firms that lack a solid reputation will
provide trade credit to customers with large bargaining power compared to firms
with a good reputation”.
With regards to empirics, the profit maximization model of Nadiri (1969) postulates
trade credit is positively related to the level of sales (i.e., the ratio of turnover to total
asset (Rodr´ıguez-Rodr´ıguez, 2006)) and inversely to its opportunity cost. Firms
with high gross profit margin would be more inclined to follow price discrimination
policies as they have more incentives to sell and to finance and additional unit
(Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Although the contrary, opposite direction movements
between profit margin and trade credit, may also be justified and tested (Blazenko
and Vandezande, 2003).
Quality and reputation issues can be tested through several variables. Long et al.
(1993) hypothesize that (1) firms with longer production cycle (which can be iden-
tified with higher quality) will extend more trade credit; (2) extending credit small
and young firms exhibit quality and acquire prestigious so they are expected to
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reputation; (3) high-quality suppliers could discourage low-quality firms by rising
the cost of trade credit, so short-term debts and accounts payable should be posi-
tively related to accounts receivable; (4) firms producing more durable goods (which
implies more time to asset quality) will extend trade credit over longer periods.
III. EMPIRICAL MODEL
In order to test and explore the patterns behind the extension of trade credit in the
sample, a panel data econometric model is specified:
yit =
∑
j
βjxjit + µi + νit ∀i, t (1)
with i (i = 1 . . . I) denoting individuals, t (t = 1 . . . T ) time and j (j = 1 . . . J) exploratory
variables, and being yit and xjit values of the variables, βj coefficients to be estimated,
µi the unobserved time-invariant individual effects and νit the error term with the usual
assumptions. Individual-invariant time effects can be modeled by adding a λt term.
The dependent variable is the proportion of accounts receivable to total assets. The
independent variables and the expected signs under the different perspectives are shown
in the Table 1.
Equation (1) can be estimated by different procedures, depending on the assumptions.
Fixed and random effects models have been widely used, but a less restrictive estimation
is possible by means of instrumental variables and the generalized method of moments
(GMM). It is a more robust alternative that allows to cope with potential heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation of the error term and also endogeneity of the regressors. Given
the difficulty in obtaining other variables correlated with the original ones but not with
the error term, it arises the possibility of using these same variables but lagged as in-
struments. Time effects are modeled through dummy variables and firm effects, provided
their large number, are eliminated by estimating the equation (1) in first differences:
∆ ln yit =
∑
j
βj∆ lnxjit +
1
2
∑
j
∑
k
βjk∆ lnxjit lnxkit +∆λt +∆νit (2)
An alternative to first differences is the orthogonal deviations transformation, which
removes individual effects but does not introduce serial correlation (Arellano and Bover,
1995). In this case, each observation is obtained as a deviation to a weighted mean of
future values, that is:
y∗it =
∑
j
βjx
∗
jit + ν
∗
it (3)
where
x∗jit =
√
T − t
T − t+ 1
(
xjit − xji,t+1 + · · ·+ xjiT
T − t
)
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose the utilization of GMM and the orthogonality
conditions between the residuals of the transformed equations and the lagged values of
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Motive
Operational Financial Commercial
Total asset turnover + + +
Debt cost − −
Return on assets +
Profit margin +
Size + −
Accounts payable + − +
Short-term bank debt − +
the original explicative variables. The estimation by GMM is carried out in two stages,
using the second one a weighted matrix constructed with the residuals obtained in the
first stage. The procedure followed in this work consists in regressing jointly the system
of equations in first differences (2) and levels (1). It was proposed (by Arellano and
Bover, 1995, Blundell and Bond, 1998, among other) in order to reduce the weakness of
instruments.
It is necessary to test lack of second order autocorrelation because the GMM estimator
is based on E(∆νit∆νi,t−2) = 0. In addition, a Sargan test of overidentifying is used to
validate the orthogonality restrictions.
A dynamic model is also specified in order to capture the effects of the variables
over time. It is a way of considering that the changes of the variables do not affect
instantaneously but they have a period of adjustment.
yit = λyi,t−1 +
∑
j
βjxjit + µi + νit (4)
If the time dimension of the data set is short, the estimation by fixed or random effects is
inconsistent due to the fact that the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error
term. An efficient and non-biased option is the GMM estimator previously mentioned
(Arellano and Bover, 1995, Blundell and Bond, 1998).
IV. DATA AND RESULTS
A. Descriptive analysis
The sources of this work are the provincial mercantile registers, to whose infor-
mation we have accessed through the SABI data base (http://www.informa.es/).
The selection includes companies of food and beverage industry (code 15 following
CNAE-93 classification, National Statistics Institute of Spain), with information
on the variables income from sales and customers’ accounts over the period 1998-
2005. The latter has been the bounding factor as a lot of firms present abbreviated
balance sheets and customers’ account appears aggregated with other receivables.
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ACCOUNTS RECEIV ABLE
TOTAL ASSETS
RATIO
average percentile average
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Accounts receivable (%) 29 3 11 17 21 25 30 34 39 45 61
2. Accounts payable (%) 21 18 15 16 18 20 21 22 24 26 28
3. Net trade credit (%) 8 -14 -3 1 3 5 9 11 14 19 33
4. Total asset turnover (%) 149 114 97 113 123 135 152 153 166 197 245
5. Return on assets (%) 3,7 3,3 3,8 3,4 3,0 3,3 4,2 4,0 4,0 3,6 4,0
6. Profit margin (%) 3,4 3,8 6,0 4,2 3,2 2,9 3,5 3,2 3,1 2,4 2,1
7. Size (%) 100 117 159 126 114 108 95 96 65 63 56
8. Short-term bank debt(%) 23 24 22 21 21 22 23 23 25 28 25
9. Debt cost (%) 7,4 14,8 5,3 6,7 6,1 8,3 7,2 7,2 7,0 6,0 5,3
10. Current (%) 199 215 214 256 212 188 177 190 202 158 176
11. Reserves (%) 26 23 25 31 29 26 28 28 27 23 23
1. Accounts receivable/total assets
2. Accounts payable/total assets
3. (Accounts receivable - accounts payable)/total assets
4. Sales/total assets
5. Operating profit/ total assets
6. Operating profit/Sales
7. Total assets/total assets (industry average)
8. (Short run debts less commercial creditors)/total assets
9. Financial expenditures/(Long and short run debts less commercial creditors)
10. Current assets/current liabilities
12. Reserves/total assets
9After removing outliers, it was obtained a panel sample of 388 firms with data of 8
consecutive years.
Table 2 classifies several accounting ratios of the firms of the sample according to
the percentiles of the customer accounts receivable to total assets ratio, in order to
accomplish a first approach to the factors associated with the extension of trade
credit. The average proportion of trade credit extended to customers is 29 % (row
number 1) on total assets, meanwhile the trade credit payable to suppliers is 21 %
(row 2). A creditor position is the most usual, being the net trade credit (extended
less payable) 8% over total assets on average (row 3). This highlights the role of
financial intermediation assumed by agrofood firms and the interest in deepening
the factors associatted with this behavior.
If other variables are considered, it seems to be a positive relationship between trade
credit extended and the level of activity: the total assets turnover ratio sales
total assets
increases in each percentile (excluded the first), passing from 97% in percentile no 2
to 245% in no 10 (row 4). Thus, a first approach to the sample gives some support
to the hypothesis that the extension of trade credit is used as a means of promoting
sales. That is, besides an productive activity, the companies of the sample provide
financial services to gain competitivity and increase market share. A less clear
positive relationship is observed between trade credit extended and operating profit
to total asset ratio (row 5): the 1-5 percentiles take values lower than 4%, below
the values of the remaining. However, the firms that extend more trade credit have
a lower profit margin (row 6).
On the other hand, firm size (row 7) is negatively related to accounts receivable, so
the smaller a supplier is the more credit gives, in proportion to its total assets. This
could mean that larger companies have some capacity to choose customers with
better payment conditions, in detriment of the remaining firms that have to work
with stretching payment periods. Trade credit seems to play an important role for
small producers, and this would be in consonance with commercial motives, rather
than the financial ones.
Trade credit received from suppliers rises with trade credit given to customers. As
can be seen in row 2, the first four percentiles show an account payable ratio lower
than 20% but higher than this percentage in the followings, getting almost 30% in
the last percentile. Likewise, the ratio of short-term bank debts (row 8) show a
slight positive relationship at first look. These insights seem also opposite to the
financial view. Firms inclined to extend trade credit would not have many reasons
to receive it or to borrow from banks, therefore a negative relationship would be
expected according to this perspective.
The cost of bank debts (row 9) takes a very expensive value (14,8%) for the firms
of first percetile, in contrast with a cheaper financing of the ones that more trade
credit extend (last percentile, 5,3%), so a negative link seems more plausible. The
current ratio (row 10) and the reserves to assets ratio (row 11) show also a loose
negative relationship with trade credit extended: starting from the third percentile
they take descending values.
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Table 3: DAYS SALES OUTSTANDING
year
1988 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
15. Food and drink industry 78 81 83 82 86 83 84 85
151 Meat processing 72 80 83 81 83 87 90 88
152 Fish processing 82 77 79 76 78 76 76 77
153 Fruit & vegetables 76 76 79 77 84 84 78 81
154 Oils & fats 64 64 68 78 62 62 64 69
155 Dairy 71 73 80 76 76 75 78 72
156 Grain milling 79 77 81 83 80 82 77 85
157 Animal feed 59 62 65 63 68 61 63 66
158 Miscellaneous products 75 77 77 74 86 73 73 72
159 Drinks 104 106 110 112 114 110 112 116
The days sales outstanding or average collection period for the food and drink firms
of the sample (Table 3) is almost three months, rising from 78 days in 1988 to 85
in 2005. This is an increase of 7 days during the studied period, a day each year on
average. To fight against delayed payment periods in commercial operations, the
Spanish late payments law (the transposition of Directive 2000/35/EC), starts on
December 2004. Although the time to observe its effects is short, no signal of trend
change is perceived in year 2005.
At a lower level of disaggregation two industries stand out. On the one hand, animal
feed presents the shortest collection period, around two months (59 days in 1998 and
66 in 2005). On the other extreme, the drink industry reaches by far three months
(104 days in 1998 and 116 in 2005). Except for fish and miscellaneous products,
the average collection period of all other sub-industries registers a growth, being
the largest for drinks firms with 12 days of increase. The variability of collection
periods is bigger within meat and drinks companies, so that periods up to 10 or 11
months can be found.
B. Univariate tests
Table 4 presents tests for mean equality in a attempt to respond to the question: are
there differences between firms that extend more and less trade credit?. To do this,
first the firms of the sample are classified in two groups, above and bellow the median
of the accounts receivable to total assets ratio; second parametric (ANOVA F) and
nonparametric (Kruskal-Wallis) tests are performed to check if exist differences in
the central tendency measures of both groups. The answer is yes: all the ratios,
except reserves to assets, have statistically different values for the mean or median
if firms are separated into more or less inclined to extend trade credit.
C. Multivariate regressions
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Table 4: UNIVARIATE TESTS FOR MEAN EQUALITY OF SOME VARIABLES
CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO THE ACCOUNTS RECEIV ABLE
TOTAL ASSETS
RATIO
F χ21
(ANOVA) (KRUSKAL-WALLIS)
1. Accounts receivable (%) 5218.80** 2327.30**
2. Accounts payable (%) 231.02** 305.98**
3. Net trade credit (%) 1204.90** 1027.70**
4. Total asset turnover (%) 472.26** 530.03**
5. Return on assets (%) 8.80** 20.23**
6. Profit margin (%) 21.75** 15.06**
7. Size (%) 94.72** 15.06**
8. Short-term bank debt(%) 25.64** 35.05**
9. Debt cost (%) 3.47 44.17**
10. Current (%) 15.76** 0.19
11. Reserves (%) 0.81 0.70
Asterisks, (*), (**), indicate the null of mean equality is rejected
at critical level of 5% and 1%, respectivaly
Table 5: GMM ESTIMATIONS (SECOND STAGE)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ACOUNTS RECEIVABLE/TOTAL ASSETS
STATIC DYNAMIC
coefficient t value coefficient t value
Accounts receivable (-1) 0.564 10.30**
Total asset turnover 0.050 3.97** 0.034 2.94**
Profit margin -0.028 0.790
Debt cost -0.036 -4.05** -0.022 -3.33**
Size -0.011 -2.37* -0.005 -2.02*
Accounts payable 0.238 3.50** 0.177 3.67**
Short-term bank debt 0.216 4.35** 0.118 2.48**
Statistics value prob value prob
Wald (joint): 68.22 (χ26) 0.000** 299.42 (χ
2
6) 0.000**
Wald (dummy): 54.54 (χ216) 0.000** 11.75 (χ
2
15) 0.698
Wald (time): 41.88 (χ28) 0.000** 3.83 (χ
2
7) 0.799
Sargan test: 118.90 (χ2108) 0.222 119.70 (χ
2
101) 0.099
AR(1) test: N(0,1) -5.08 0.000** -6.80 0.000**
AR(2) test: N(0,1) -1.81 0.070 0.58 0.559
Time and three-digit industrial dummies are included
Asterisks indicate significance at 5% (*) and 1% (**) level
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The GMM estimations, static and dynamic, are presented in Table 5. Both con-
sider the joint system of equations in levels and orthogonal deviations. They use as
instruments the same variables lagged 1 and 2 years for the equations in deviations,
and first differences lagged one period for the equations in levels. Annual and indus-
try dummies are included in all estimation to control temporal shocks and industry
specific effects but their results are not shown in the Tables. The basic hypotheses
of the estimator are fulfilled. That is, the Sargan tests do not reject the suitability
of the instruments. The AR(2) tests indicate there are no serious problems with
second order autocorrelation. Wald tests reject the null of joint insignificance of the
regressors employed. Wald tests for time and three-digit dummies indicate they are
significant for the static model but not for the dynamic one. Explanatory variables
not significant, such as market interest rate or other financial ratios, were excluded
from the final estimations.
The results confirm a clear relationship between the volume of sales and the accounts
receivable ratio, given positive and significant coefficients in both models. In other
words, more active firms extend more trade credit. This is in consonance with the
bulk of the predictions of theoretic reasoning but it does not permit to discriminate
between them. Likewise, the debt cost is negative and significant as predicted by
financial theories but also by commercial ones. The debt cost is in fact the price of
capital that suppliers use for selling on credit, so whatever the motives its demand
is downward sloped. Cheaper bank financing induce to sell more on credit or to
enlarge collection periods, adding a financial activity to its own productive.
The profit ratio is not significant in both estimations (it is omitted in the dynamic
model). The return on assets ratio is neither significant and its results are not shown.
Therefore, the idea that more profitable firms provide more credit to their customers
is not supported for the data, and the price discrimination motive vanishes.
The size variable is negative and significant at 5% level in both estimations. This ev-
idence reveals that larger suppliers do not play as financial intermediaries providing
credit to distressed customers as predicted by financial theories. On the contrary,
smaller producers appear as more inclined to provide credit and to delay collection
moments. This leads to think that the role of sales promotion might be more appro-
priate, since larger firms have a lesser need of selling on credit to encourage product
demand than smaller ones.
The account payable ratio is positive and significant in both estimations. This could
mean that there are suppliers without better financing alternatives than postponing
payments. And in spite of its expensive cost and its drawbacks, they continue
granting credit because they have strong commercial motivations or because they
do not have other way of selling their products. Other possible interpretation could
be that customers enlarge payments periods because they do not have too many
incentives to pay on time to suppliers with financial difficulties. That is, the scarce
bargaining power of small producers leads to an involuntary action of extending
trade credit. In any case, a positive sign between receivable and payable ratios is
against a financial perspective of trade credit. The positive sign of the short-term
bank debt ratio also strengthens this finding, as it implies that there are a lot of
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Table 6: GMM ESTIMATIONS (SECOND STAGE)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NET TRADE CREDIT/TOTAL ASSETS
STATIC DYNAMIC
coefficient t value coefficient t value
Accounts receivable (-1) 0.289 2.16*
Total asset turnover 0.031 3.21** 0.018 1.54
Debt cost -0.117 -15.00** -0.088 -5.44**
Size -0.016 -2.21* -0.014 -2.38*
Short-term bank debt 0.304 5.27** 0.273 5.15**
Statistics value prob value prob
Wald (joint): 305.80 (χ24) 0.000** 507.20 (χ
2
5) 0.000**
Sargan test: 80.43 (χ272) 0.232 74.05 (χ
2
67) 0.259
AR(1) test: N(0,1) -5.56 0.000** -3.34 0.001**
AR(2) test: N(0,1) -1.59 0.111 0.25 0.802
firms making use of short-term bank loans to finance their sales.
Further regressions have been undertaken (Table 6) to check the robustness of the
results. Now the dependent variable is net trade credit (accounts receivable less
accounts payable) to total assets ratio. The above mentioned relationships still
apply. The creditor position of firms is clearly related to short-term bank debts and
to smaller sizes, which again points to commercial rather than financial theories.
And at last, a comment on the dynamic adjustment model. It reduces second serial
correlation of the residual as is shown by AR(2) tests. Both lagged dependent
variables are positive and significant, which indicate there is not a immediately
response to changes in the short run. Instead, the variations of the dependent
variables to movements in the explanatory variables are slow and take a time. The
adjustment process for net trade credit is faster than for accounts receivable, given
a lower coefficient estimated for the former. The period of adjustment is 1.29 years
for accounts receivable but only 0.41 years (less than 5 months) for net trade credit.
This persistence behavior should be modeled through lagged variables, otherwise
error conclusions may be obtained.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A set of firms within the Spanish agrofood industry has been studied to investigate the
motives behind the extension of trade credit. Specifically, a panel of 388 firms over the
period 1998-2005 has been analyzed. In this sample, a creditor position in relation to
trade credit is the most common, i.e. firms sell to customers more than they buy to their
suppliers on credit. The difference between trade credit extended and received is 8% on
average. The collection period was 78 days in 1998 and rose to 85 days in 2005. This
upward tendency does not seem to have been broken by the entrance of the late payment
legislation in december 2004. It is worth to note that excesively large collection periods,
almost 4 months, are detected in drinks firms.
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At a fist glance to the sample, it can be seen that the accounts receivable ratio is
positively related to total asset turnover and accounts payable, and negatively to size
and debt cost. More in depth regression analysis with static and dynamic estimations
confirms these relationships and allows to test some theories on the extension of trade
credit. Commercial motives are supported by the data against financial ones. The pos-
itive sign of total asset turnover ratio and the negative one of debt cost do not help to
discriminate between competing theories. However, financial theories are discarded on the
grounds that there is no evidence of larger or creditworthy suppliers transmitting credit to
customers with difficulties as found in other empirical works (Petersen and Rajan, 1997,
Herna´ndez de Cos and Hernando, 1999, Delannay and Weill, 2004, Rodr´ıguez-Rodr´ıguez,
2006).
Instead, the role of trade credit as a mechanism to promote sales and gain compet-
itiveness is reinforced. The negative link with size and the positive one with accounts
payable and short-term bank debt ratios prove the existence of firms extending trade
credit that do not have the best conditions to do it. Customer receivables are financed by
both types of short-term debts, providers and banks, and this means that producers have
to use expensive financing in order to finish their production cycles. Thus, there is evi-
dence of small and financially constrained agrofood suppliers who are used (or compelled)
to selling on credit, which gives rise to commercial motives (in the line of Nadiri, 1969,
Long et al., 1993, Deloof and Jegers, 1996, Van Horen, 2004). The causes behind this
behavior are probably the composition of the sample, small productive firms, the strong
competition of the market within they operate and the market power of large customers.
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